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Lack of transparency in securitization transactions significantly contributed to the 
severe financial crisis of 2007–2009. To increase transparency we—based on a 
recent idea by Markowitz (2009)—propose an incentive compatible mechanism 
for future securitization transactions: financial claims with fingerprints. They 
would allow market participants at each stage of the securitization process to 
obtain easily full information about the underlying original risks and the superior 
claims that need to be satisfied before receiving their own payoffs. The fingerprint 
mechanism would considerably enhance transparency in securitization 
transactions at the expense of some transaction costs, while reducing the need for 
government involvement in securitization markets. 
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1 Introduction 
 
In 2007 the U.S. housing market bubble burst, triggering a financial crisis that has resulted in 
a worldwide recession. Among the problems that contributed to the crisis, securitization of 
mortgages and repackaging or tranching of mortgage-backed securities (MBS) into 
collateralized debt obligations (CDO) is often named.
1 MBS and especially CDO seem to 
exhibit a large degree of opaqueness, i.e., market participants in many cases have limited 
information about the true nature of the risks of the underlying mortgages. With every 
additional repackaging there is significant potential for information loss. This led the market 
for these securities dry up. Furthermore, banks holding these opaque securities faced major 
refinancing problems. 
 
The apparent collapse of the market for MBS has led to demand for stricter regulation of 
transactions, compulsory trading of asset-backed securities at stock exchanges by many 
policymakers and commentators. Some have called for complete bans on MBS.  
 
We propose an incentive compatible mechanism that takes fingerprints of the original 
mortgages and of MBS transactions.
  By fingerprints we mean a complete record of 
information related to the original mortgage transactions and all subsequent securitizations of 
those mortgages. This would solve many of the problems of these markets without the need 
for stricter regulation and without impeding the potential for innovations in the markets for 
securitization. We believe that our mechanism produces advantages at all stages of the 
securitization process at the expense of possibly mild transaction costs. Our mechanism is 
related to a recent proposal by Franke and Krahnen (2008) and by the Issing Committee 
(Issing et al., 2008, 2009) to create a global risk map and a global credit register, and the 
proposal by Brunnermeier (2008) to set up a clearing house in order to support regulatory 
authorities. While the ideas by the Issing Committee, Franke and Krahnen (2008) and 
Brunnermeier (2008) especially seem to address systemic risks stemming from interbank 
relationships, counterparty risk, and the opaqueness of financial institutions, our proposal is 
targeted at the specific, but important market segment, mortgage-backed securities, that has 
experienced market failure. Furthermore, our proposal does not entail stricter regulation for 
MBS, instead it creates incentives for market participants to enhance transparency, thus 
                                                 
1 For a in-depth overview of the crisis and its causes see, e.g., Brunnermeier (2009), Dowd (2008), Franke and 
Krahnen (2008), Gorton (2008), Hellwig (2008).   3
keeping the free market and its innovative forces alive. Despite the non-regulatory approach 
developed here, our mechanism could be an integral part of a global risk map system. 
 
Our proposal is based on an idea put forward by Harry Markowitz (2009). As part of 
regulatory actions to overcome the immediate problems of the financial crisis, Markowitz 
suggests setting up a regulatory body that would perform an in-depth census of institutions 
owning securitized assets. The information collected would encompass detailed information 
on security claim structures and underlying mortgage risks. Markowitz (2009) suggests using 
this information to solve severe problems of the current financial crisis—no confidence in 
financial institutions already holding securitized assets and no trade in “toxic assets.” We 
show that a systematic collection of securitization transaction data could actually become the 
cornerstone of an incentive compatible mechanism used in future securitization transactions 
and thus allowing for a revival of securitization markets, while at the same time requiring no 
new regulation.  
 
In section 2, we use an example to sketch the opaqueness problem inherent in the MBS 
market. Section 3 outlines our proposal to create more transparency in the MBS market. 
Finally, in Section 4, we discuss limitations of our approach as well as possible extensions. 
 
 
2 A Simple MBS/CDO-Transaction and its Informational Problems 
 
In order to illustrate our proposal we start with the description of a simple fully-funded 
MBS/CDO-transaction as shown in Figure 1.  
 
Figure 1: Mortgage-Backed Securitization at Present  
 
-- Figure 1 about here -- 
 
We consider two financial institutions, Originators O1 and O2, both of whom provide 
mortgages to homeowners. The loan characteristics of the borrowers are described by matrix 
L. Each row of the matrix, for instance, L1
O1, represents the characteristics of one lender-
borrower relationship. This information is gathered by the originator during credit scoring and 
subsequent credit monitoring activities. Entries include various information such as loan 
characteristics (principal debt, interest rate – fixed or variable, duration, currency   4
denomination), borrower characteristics (income, employment status, financial assets and 
liabilities, fico score, delinquency and foreclosure status), and collateral characteristics (ZIP 
code, house type, size, age, value). 
 
Each originator now plans to securitize its mortgage portfolio. In order to do this each 
portfolio is cut into three different tranches: a senior, a mezzanine and an equity tranche, 
according to a desired risk and return profile.
2 The nominal terms (principal, interest, 
duration) of each tranche are described by vectors N. The cash flows coming from the 
mortgage portfolios C
O1 and C
O2 are then distributed to the different tranches according to the 
waterfall principle. This means that the senior tranche has the first claim, followed by the 
mezzanine tranche and, finally, the equity tranche, also called the first loss piece, having the 
residual claim.  
 
Next, the securitization transaction is completed by selling all or some of the tranches to 
different investors. In order to signal quality, originators obtain a rating from a rating agency. 
For the sake of simplicity, we follow only the path of the mezzanine tranches of both 
originators, M
O1 and M
O2. We assume, without loss of generality, that these tranches are 
bought by Intermediary A. In the next step, Intermediary A repackages the cash flows C
MO1 
and C
MO2, and forms another three tranches which he sells to investors or intermediaries. Such 
securities are called collateralized debt obligations (CDO). As before, a rating is obtained 
from a rating agency to facilitate these transactions. The new mezzanine tranche, M
A, is 
bought by Investor B. His information problem, and also the problem of the rating agency 
involved, is that already at this second stage of bundling and tranching risks, it will often not 
be possible to know the precise nature of the original home loans and to observe their 
performance as time progresses (Gorton, 2008).  
 
With every step of repackaging cash flows from different sources and the respective payoff 
functions are combined into MBS which increases opaqueness. This is one of the roots of the 
present financial crisis. Rating agencies proved to be wrong about their rating assessments 
resulting in the lack of trust and credibility in the securitization market that has led to market 
                                                 
2 Without loss of generality, we omit the involvement of a special purpose vehicle typically assisting these 
transactions.   5
failure. Securitization might be advantageous for contract partners but is seriously hindered by 




3 A Proposal to Overcome the Lack of Transparency in the MBS-Market 
 
The goal of our proposal is to overcome opaqueness in the MBS market. This can be achieved 
if investors, intermediaries and rating agencies are able to have a direct look at the original 
risks at every single stage of securitization or repackaging. The central element of our concept 
is a data center which is called “Global Mortgage Data Center”, depicted in Figure 2.  
 
Figure 2: Securitization with a Global Mortgage Data Center 
 
-- Figure 2 about here -- 
 
As in Markowitz (2009), our proposed data center would collect two types of data: mortgage 
characteristics and securitization related information. The mortgage characteristics L and 
results from subsequent monitoring activities are reported by originators.
4 The contract 
characteristics of all securitization and rebundling activities are reported, both by originators 
and intermediaries. The latter, again, consists of two information subcategories. The first 
category comprises the nominal terms of the tranches, N, i.e., the tranche principal, the 
interest rate promised, contract duration, time structure of payments. The second category 
consists of the claims functions. Here, the payoff functions of the tranches are reported to the 
data center. In order to assure high quality for the information reported, it might be necessary 
for the participating institutions to obtain some kind of certification by the data center and to 
comply with a standardized format and reporting intervals for the reports, or even to contract 
                                                 
3 In light of the information problems described above, one might question why the market for securitization of 
mortgages evolved rapidly and apparently functioned well for several years. For example, Brunnermeier (2009), 
Dowd (2008), Franke and Krahnen (2008), Gorton (2008), Hellwig (2008) provide an explanation – low interest 
rates encouraged lending, home prices continually increased, and there was significant liquidity in the market. 
Market participants may even have known about the problems with the pricing of mortgage credit risk, but may 
have factored in an implicit government backing of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, the two main players in the 
U.S. mortgage market. Other possible explanations include the overconfidence of investors in this new market, 
executive compensation schemes rewarding high risk strategies, as well as regulatory and ratings arbitrage. 
There might even have been a rational interest in opaqueness on the part of some market participants in order to 
deprive firms and, in the end, society (Akerlof and Romer, 1993). 
4 In practice, information data centers already exist that allow market participants to share information regarding 
certain risks. For instance, the MIB Group, Inc., collects medical care data on insured individuals in North 
America. The data can be accessed by member insurance companies to support underwriting decisions and fraud 
detection.   6
on such terms. For the mezzanine tranches, examples for such functions are given in Figure 2 
in the right corner of the data center box. These reports exclusively refer to information 
available to the reporting institutions, information that is typically given in a prospectus.  
 
Consider for example Intermediary A’s report: He reports the payoff function, C
MA, 
containing the sources of cash flows to be repackaged, C
MO1 and C
MO2, the nominal promises 
he makes for the mezzanine tranche, N
MA, which again depends on the terms of the senior 
tranche, N
SA, also to be reported by A.
5 All the information that Intermediary A reports to the 
data center, constitutes the “fingerprint” of A’s intermediation activities. Fingerprints are 
centrally collected and can for a fee be accessed by other market participants, thus allowing 
for full transparency. 
 
An important advantage of this system is that all parties that need information about the cash 
flow from A’s mezzanine tranche, C
MA, in our case Investor B or the rating agency, do not 
have to rely solely on information provided by Intermediary A. Via the data center, they can 
directly analyze the original risks. This is done by purchasing information from the data 
center. If we take the payoff formula C
MA, then the variables C
MO1 and C
MO2, making up the 
cash flow well for C
MA, are substantiated by the originators’ reports which also provide 
information about the original risks C
O1 and C
O2, going back to the single mortgages, 
described by L. 
 
The payoff function C
MA now provides the opportunity for Investor B, a rating agency or a 
regulator to kick their tires, i.e., make their own calculations. They get full information about 
both the underlying loan portfolio and the superior claims that need to be satisfied before 
receiving their own payoffs. They can simulate the original mortgage cash flows under 
different distributional and dependency assumptions; they can perform stress tests as they 
like; or, they can use updated information about mortgage risks. The data center enhances 
understanding of the risks being assumed. 
 
What guarantees a high quality of the information reported to the data center? While there is 
no guarantee that a complete and accurate information will be provided by all, there will be a 
                                                 
5 Also, the information which part of the first loss piece an originator keeps on his balance sheet could be 
reported. As Franke and Krahnen (2008) emphasize, a substantial retention of the first loss piece in the 
originator’s book contributes to the mitigation of moral hazard problems by inducing a strong incentive for the 
originator to be cautious in his underwriting activities.   7
strong incentive for all market participants to report their information according to standards 
defined by the data center: The originators know that it is crucial for the success of their 
securitization that the bond buyers will be able pass the risks on in order to achieve their 
desired risk-return profile. This, however, will depend on the transparency of the contract data 
on the next levels of risk transfer, provided by data center information. This line of reasoning 
applies to all buyers and sellers in the risk transfer chain.
6  
 
If there are in the end missing links in the information chain, the consequence will be that 
opaqueness must be compensated by the bond sellers through higher risk premiums (interest 
rate payments) or the MBS will not be able to be transferred in the market.
7 It might also turn 
out that the chain of repackaging seems to be too long and dendritic, comprising risks, e.g., in 
areas of the world where the potential bond buyer has no professional expertise. In this case, 
again, knowing about the original risks and the sequence of payoff functions is of advantage, 
and gives rise to higher return requirements or to turning down the offer. 
 
Both parties, buyers and sellers of MBS, obviously are better off as a result of sharing the 
information in the data center. Consequently, it should be possible to finance the development 
and operation of the data center by fees paid by market participants, especially potential 
investors or rating agencies buying information. Significantly, our proposal does not imply 
more regulation to enhance transparency; rather it is a market solution to achieve this end.  
 
Finally, the proposed mechanism would be advantageous to homeowners seeking a mortgage. 
Of course, part of the transaction costs of the fingerprint mechanism will be rolled over to 
them. But, the ability of mortgage market intermediaries to securitize or repackage the 
original risks more easily should result in greater availability of capital for mortgages and 
lower interest rates. 
 
 
4 Discussion of the Proposal and Possible Extensions 
 
A major hurdle for the proposed fingerprint mechanism is financing its inception. A free-rider 
problem may arise: the first market participants using this mechanism would incur most of the 
                                                 
6 Furthermore, by not complying with the standards of the data center the market participant involved would be 
contractually liable to the data center.  
7 This is the classical „Market for Lemons“ argument of Akerlof (1970).   8
fixed costs for founding and early operation of the risk data center, whereas subsequent 
participants would in general only need to contribute a small share to the costs of operation. 
However, we believe that the enormous advantages of the mechanism–re-launching the 
market for securitization and avoiding over-regulation–should be a strong incentive for 
intermediaries to engage in a joint effort to establish the data center. One could also think of 
an existing institution, such as the Bank for International Settlements for instance, creating 
and operating the data center. 
 
Another aspect is the financing structure for the risk data center. In Section 3 we assumed that 
information has to be purchased by market participants. It might also be possible to run the 
system on a club basis, with no marginal costs for data access. Here, each institution that 
wants to participate in fingerprinted transactions would need to pay some kind of annual fee 
to the data center. Which of the two financing methods would prove to be superior we 
presently have to leave to further research. 
 
Informational asymmetries are not an issue solely related to the MBS securitization market. 
Thus, it might also be a good idea to use the fingerprint mechanism in non-mortgage related 
areas. We believe that the transfer of our idea to other market segments would require the 
ability to provide standardized information to the data center. This seems likely in the area of 
car loans, for instance, but may be a problem in areas where the underlying risk is less 
standardized, like tailored loans to corporations (encompassing various covenants or options). 
 
A further aspect to consider is the possible need for confidentiality. A homeowner or 
originator may not want information provided to the data center. The homeowner’s agreement 
to have information reported to the data center could be obtained as part of the mortgage 
contract. Since our mechanism is not compulsory, we might observe two market segments, 
fingerprint transactions with low interest rates and a low level of confidentiality, and non-
fingerprint transactions with high interest rates and high level of confidentiality and 
opaqueness. 
 
Finally, it is an open question whether fingerprinting is possible in structures involving 
synthetic collateralized debt obligations (CDO) and credit default swaps (CDS). In general, 
information relating to risks of the underlying loans and payoff functions that would need to 
be provided to the data center would be similar in synthetic transactions. However, one issue   9
that would need to be resolved in this case would be how to handle and report counterparty 
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Claims functions (here only shown for mezzanine tranches, ignoring timing) 







































O1 = sum(Cash flows from O1’s mortgage portfolio L
O1) 
C
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